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Abstract 
The predominance of technocracy and preference for institutional independence that was key to 
the market-state relationship since the end of the cold-war is being challenged by renewed calls 
for re-politicisation from across the political spectrum. The prime examples in developed 
economies are President Trump in the USA and the Labour Party leadership under Jeremy Corbyn 
in Britain. Re-politicisation points to a different, state-centric, model of accountability and 
legitimacy for the operation of institutions. This chapter examines calls for a return to political-
institutional environments long extinct in the west, and (up until recently) in retreat in the 
developing world. The chapter argues that the contemporary critique of central bank independence 
has nothing to do with the literature on empowerment and greater accountability that was 
developed at the time of (and since) the financial crisis; and reflects on a metamorphosis of debates 
towards undemocratic, capricious, populist and state-centric directions. This phenomenon has 
profound implications for emerging economies where efforts to build a pro-market institutional 
and legal framework have long focused on the promotion of independent institutions, like central 
banks. The chapter argues that these developments in the political centres of the west directly 
undermine modernising efforts in emerging economies. 
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Introduction 
 
The second decade of the 21st century has blessed us to live in interesting times. One of the ways 
this finds expression is through a historical change in our perception of institutions and state 
behaviour. The predominance of technocracy and institutional independence that underpinned our 
understanding of the market-state relationship since the end of the cold-war is being upended by 
renewed calls for re-politicisation from across the political spectrum. This is particularly evident 
in the area of central banking. The prime examples of this change of attitude towards independent 
institutions are of course the actions of President Trump in the USA and the proposed policies of 
the Labour Party leadership in Britain. Other examples from emerging economies include 
pressures on central banks ranging from President Erdogan of Turkey to tensions in India.  The 
focus on the desirability (or not) of maintaining the technocratic status of central banks is a 
significant development for two reasons. Firstly, it points to a different, state centric, model of 
accountability and legitimacy for the operation of institutions. Secondly, it is significant because 
it is unfolding in an environment where a critique of institutional independence, based on issues 
like democratic accountability, is being overtaken -one could argue even hijacked- by a reactionary 
(extreme-left or hard-right nationalistic) critique that is at its base paternalistic (suggesting, a 
leader-knows-best approach). Such critique has little to do with the literature on empowerment and 
greater accountability that was developed at the time of (and since) the financial crisis. What we 
are dealing with now is a metamorphosis of a debate on economic management towards 
undemocratic, capricious and state centric directions. A political economy context such as the one 
described in this chapter influences central banking, particularly in emerging economies. As a 
result, in a sharp reversal to what had become orthodox thinking at the end of the 20th and the 
beginning of the 21st century, partisan politics is back on the driving seat of debates about central 
banks and their operations. 
 
The chapter starts by explaining how institutional independence (and central bank independence 
in particular) represented a meeting point between market freedom and state support for economic 
development. It explains through the lens of institutional economics how legal and political 
initiatives led to the development of a stable equilibrium between democracy and the policy 
predictability needed for markets to flourish. The chapter then investigates how the idea of central 
bank independence took root and became the orthodoxy of macroeconomic policy. The discussion 
moves on to the critique of central bank independence and the consequences of a sustained attack 
from the left (but also the right) of the political spectrum on eroding the consensus in favour of 
institutional independence. The chapter concludes by highlighting the potentially destabilising 
effects for emerging market economies of a populist-driven retreat from independence in the west 
and reflects on how to preserve the core benefits of central bank independence for emerging 
economies. 
 
Where we were 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present how the changing political economy of central banking is 
affecting and will affect the future of central banks in emerging economies. In order to do this, the 
chapter begins with a presentation of the orthodox view of the state-market relationship as it 
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operated from the fall of communism in the early 1990s, till the financial crisis of 2008. The legacy 
of the 1990s and the collapse of centrally planned economies has had a profound effect on our 
understanding of the state-market relationship (Glinavos 2013). We no longer view it as a 
relationship of opposition (in which the market stands against the state) but as a co-existent 
relationship in which state and market are mutually supportive. Institutional economists like 
Douglass North and Oliver Williamson have helped us understand the connections by offering a 
framework for explaining how state action and a foundation of law are complementary to 
successful market institutions (Groenewegen et al. 2010). An associated development has been 
increased recognition of the fact that democratic regimes are essential to the development of 
transparent and accountable states, within which, the market is the ultimate good. This is because 
through market promotion policy makers believe that economic and social rights are guaranteed 
(Anghie 2000). Binding democratic politics with law-based policy making (consistent with market 
respecting boundaries) is best achieved via politically independent institutions that place checks 
both on politicians’ interpretations of the popular will, and protect the public from possible 
arbitrariness, unpredictability or capriciousness of political leaderships. Independent central banks, 
have been a key example of such independent institutions, forming the core of the contemporary 
(orthodox) understanding of economic processes and the state-market relationship.  
 
An integral part of the way the market-state relationship has found balance in the last 20 years is 
through this idea of institutional independence from political control, with the most prominent 
expression of the promotion of institutional independence being central bank independence. 
Central bank independence ensures that macroeconomic policy is determined solely by ‘economic’ 
concerns. This promotes the pursuit of policies deemed good for the ‘investment climate’. It also, 
however, limits governmental discretion and this has led to popular consternation and significant 
political critique. States are less able to control their economy or to pursue expansionary economic 
policies to achieve policy objectives (Watson 2002). We will now consider the provenance of the 
doctrine of central bank independence in some more depth. 
 
The core of the intellectual case for central bank independence revolves around the assumption of 
a persistent inflationary bias built into politicians’ monetary policy preferences (Glinavos 2013, p. 
50). It is argued that this bias can only be negated by vesting authority in policy makers who can 
be trusted to choose a policy rule that is non-accommodating of inflationary tendencies; namely 
central bankers. Central bankers are assumed to be better placed than politicians to enforce such a 
rule, since there is no clear symmetry of interest between the central bank and the labour market 
in the way that there is between the government and the labour market (Watson 2002, p. 184). Put 
in a simpler way, there is an assumption that political control over monetary policy makes the 
business cycle dependant on the political-election timetable, with politicians trying to manipulate 
economic performance to gain short term political gain. Research (King 2005) suggests that in 
Britain, for instance, the Conservative governments that preceded Labour prior to 1997 engaged 
actively in trying to manipulate economic indicators for political purposes. There is also supportive 
evidence of political manipulation from the United States (Nordhaus 1975). Accepting this 
argument (as to the perverse incentives of politicians and their effects in distorting the economic 
cycle) was a key precondition to allowing the idea of independence to take root as a positive policy 
innovation. 
 
The notion of central bank independence has a much longer pedigree however than debates on 
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specific countries’ electoral politics. It was introduced by David Ricardo in 1824 (Nika 2018). 
While Ricardo did not use the term ‘independence’ himself, he highlighted the dangers that might 
be created when elected representatives are entrusted to issue paper money. Ricardo also argued 
against having central banks financing directly their governments’ deficits. In Ricardo’s words 
(McCulloch 1888, p. 506):  
 
 
It is said that Government could not be safely entrusted with the power of issuing paper 
money; that it would most certainly abuse it; and that, on any occasion when it was 
pressed for money to carry on a war, it would cease to pay coin, on demand, for its notes; 
and from that moment the currency would become a forced Government paper. 
 
 
King assessed the ascendency of the idea in the 1990s that monetary policy ought to be determined 
by technocratic criteria through independent central banks. Historically, attempts to depoliticise 
banking rested on distrust of both politicians and of the public to behave in a way conducive to the 
country's best interests (Glinavos 2013, p. 48). Thomas Hutchinson, an 18th century governor of 
Massachusetts, for instance, declared that 'the great cause of paper money evil was democratic 
government. The ignorant majority, when unrestrained by a superior class, always sought to temper 
with sound money' (Coggan 2011, p. 36). According to Chernow (1994, p. 132–40) the Federal 
Reserve was created, in a rather clandestine manner, in 1913 to implement banking and currency 
reforms to prevent periodic banking crises. According to Das (2011, p. 130) central bank authority 
focused on ensuring that the value of money was not undermined by inflation, an idea consistent 
with Friedrich von Hayek's (1944) argument that mechanistic rules ought to limit the central bank's 
discretion (and as a consequence the influence of political process over central bank policies). 
Technocracy however suggested a distancing from democracy. According to Lastra and Miller 
(Kleineman 2001, p. 159): 
 
 
Central banks are not majoritarian, democratic institutions. Central banks are, instead, 
technocratic bureaucracies, staffed by career employees and, typically, a few leaders 
elected by the political authorities. It might be said that any bureaucratic agency is non-
majoritarian…But the problem is greatly exacerbated in the case of central banks as 
compared with typical bureaucracies. Central banks do not simply administer a technical 
regulatory scheme affecting discrete industries or interests. They regulate price levels, 
which is one of the most fundamental powers of government, and one of the most 
important practical concerns of the public at large. 
 
 
There have been various descriptions of the meaning and forms of central bank independence 
(Nika 2018). For example, Cukierman (2008) provided four criteria for determining central bank 
independence: the ability of central bank to appoint and dismiss all of its members, including the 
members of governing board; the freedom of central bank to determine and decide on the goals of 
its monetary policy mandate; price stability as the main goal of monetary policy and whether there 
are lending restrictions imposed to central bank’s operation. Later, de Haan and Eijffinger (2016), 
incorporated two more dimensions into the notion of central bank independence, personnel 
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independence, which involves the capacity of central bank to have the final authority for the 
appointment and dismissal of its members; and financial independence, which refers to central 




Economic policy is influenced by ideological positioning to a greater degree than that assumed by 
traditional economic models (Rodrik 2014); and in the context of institutional independence, ideas 
matter more than in other areas of policy-making. North (1981) in his analysis of institutions shows 
the influence of a country’s political economy on the evolution of economic systems. This can help 
explain the discrepancy between theoretical models and real life. In a fictional world of minimal 
transaction costs, North suggests, the market would indeed take care of itself, but in the real world, 
where transaction costs are considerable, he argues that much more is needed. Institutions are 
formed to reduce the uncertainties that would otherwise hinder economic exchange. By 
introducing the realities of actual markets – such as lack of information, political factors and 
ideology – into his theoretical model, North tries to elaborate why a functioning market needs 
much more than merely a bedrock of property rights and contract laws (Glinavos 2010, p. 111).  
 
Describing the political economy that gave credence to the idea of central bank independence in 
Britain, King claims that New Labour’s decision to give the Bank of England (BoE) operational 
independence was a political decision, not an economic one. It established New Labour’s anti-
inflationary credentials and delivered on the party’s campaign promise to de-politicise the setting 
of interest rates (King 2005, p. 94). In fact, BoE independence forms part of a global trend during 
the 1990s, when more than 30 countries passed legislation acknowledging and increasing the legal 
independence of their central banks (Maxfield 1997). This trend represents one of the most 
dramatic changes in monetary frameworks since the deconstruction of the Bretton Woods regime. 
BoE reform came a decade after the start of the trend in central bank independence, which began 
with the 1989 reform of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The British decision however was not 
linked to changes in Britain’s exchange rate regime, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the 
adoption of an IMF programme, or a decision to join the Euro area – explanations that cover most 
cases of central bank reform in the 1990s (Cukierman 1994, p. 1446), but it was motivated by the 
internalisation of the idea of independence by the labour leadership (King 2005, pp. 95-96). 
 
A similar political explanation can be found for the German Bundesbank's independent structure. 
According to Bernhard (1998, p. 322) the German bank's independence resulted from the balance 
of power politics in Western Germany that could only be maintained by detaching government 
from the setting of monetary policy. It needs to be stated here that for politicians, academic 
discussions of economic gains are not enough, there also need to be clear electoral gains for the 
party in question, in order for them to champion such an institutional change. In a similar fashion, 
when the electoral costs exceed the electoral gains, politicians will have an incentive to retain the 
status quo (Glinavos 2013, p. 50). In the case of the BoE, independence provided electoral gains 
for Tony Blair’s New Labour by making the party appear economically prudent and consequently 
more attractive to voters. By contrast, the Conservatives saw only electoral costs from this reform 
as it limited their ability to set interest rates strategically. In short, the political salience of 
institutional reform proposals explains patterns of adoption or rejection (King 2005, p. 115). 
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This is not to suggest however, that everyone is convinced of the de-politicising effects of 
independence. Debelle and Fischer (1994) appear unconvinced with what they see as the three 
foundations of the idea of central bank independence. These foundations, they argue, are the 
success of the Bundesbank and the German economy, the academic literature on the assumed 
inflationary bias of politicians, and the literature on the effects of central bank independence. They 
argue instead that the Bundesbank's unwavering inflation targeting has been very costly on German 
growth. One could make the same argument about the European Central Bank (ECB) in its pre-
quantitative easing, stimulus-prone state. It should also be noted that inflation targeting, as a goal 
of monetary policy does not automatically require independence for the central bank, and further 
that the causal relationship between strict monetary policies and independence is not one 
directional. It could be for instance, that countries have independent central banks because they 
have chosen monetarist policies and not the other way around as commonly assumed (Glinavos 
2013, p. 51). 
 
The de-politicisation of central banking and the transfer of control over interest rates to 
independent central banks was also a key consequence of the success of the argument that 
Keynesian demand management was illegitimate. This was largely achieved by Friedman (Brittan 
1982) when he sought to demonstrate that a market economy would tend to gravitate towards a 
natural state of unemployment determined crucially by the cost of productivity and the distribution 
of labour (Callinicos 2010, p.15). For this reason, governments, Friedman (1963) argued, could 
not affect the rate of unemployment in the long term, unless they increased spending and cut taxes, 
which would result in an expansion of the money supply, and thus inflation. Friedman’s imperative 
to maintain monetary and fiscal stability could only be maintained therefore if the economy was 
run on an autopilot for regulating the quantity of money. This autopilot was achieved via 
institutionally independent central banks and, one could argue, inadvertently led to a re-
naturalisation of economic relations. Such re-naturalisation of economic relations suggest a return 
to the view that market processes need no state direction, that last held sway prior to the Great 
Depression (Glinavos 2013, p. 50). What can be done through achieving political consensus 
however can also be undone when the consensus fractures. It is precisely at this point of fracture 
that we turn now, examining how a change of perception first on the left, and secondly on the right 
of the political spectrum has altered the political economy supporting central bank independence 




Is it true that institutional independence, and more specifically central bank independence, results 
in apolitical economic governance, especially in the area of monetary policy? Those approaching 
the question from a critical standpoint (for critical, see left), argue that independence does not in 
fact ‘de-politicise’, but it only cements a particular ideology as the perpetual background to 
economic decision making. McNamara argues (2002) that the advocacy of central bank 
independence relies on a series of contestable arguments including its purported de-politicising 
effects. Delegation of economic decision making to politically independent institutions does not 
in and of itself eliminate partisan politics and interests, and monetary policy of any type (especially 
one with a strong anti-inflationary bias) has specific distributional consequences that raise 
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important questions about legitimacy and accountability. While control of inflation is currently the 
standard priority of all central banks (Fed, BoE, ECB) this does not mean that it is a policy without 
political content. There is indeed a trade-off between low inflation, growth and employment 
outcomes (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997), which leads one to ask why is it political meddling to 
allow higher inflation and keep interest rates low as part of a policy aiming to promote employment 
and growth (or to eat away at public debt), while it is not political interference to maintain a strict 
inflation targeting regime in an economic climate (like the one post financial crisis for example) 
where the target arguably suppresses growth and employment? Callinicos (2010) argues that the 
effect of the financial crisis has been to broaden political horizons and to allow citizens to question 
a distinctive feature of economic orthodoxy, which he calls the ‘naturalisation’ of economic 
relations. State intervention in the economy in the form of Keynesian policies, or bailouts (such as 
those experienced in response to the financial crisis post 2008) re-legitimise the idea of political 
involvement in the economy. The lesson of the Phillips curve which posits a trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment (Callinicos 2010, p. 14) was that governments could choose the mix 
of inflation and unemployment that best suited their values and priorities. This ability of 
governments implies that economic relations are not governed by autonomous mechanisms 
resembling those driving physical processes (Glinavos 2013, p. 53). Consequently, a central bank 
run on an inflation obsessed auto-pilot, may not be offering the best service to the nation it operates 
in.  
 
One could also legitimately ask, for instance, why is it political to run a monetary policy with an 
eye on social consequences for the worse off, while it is apolitical and technically sound to run 
such a policy (with price stability as an imperative) when it happens to benefit the already well-
off? Joseph Stiglitz noted in an article to the Economist (1998, p. 216) that decisions made by 
central bankers are not just technical decisions, they involve trade-offs, judgements about whether 
the risks of inflation are worth the benefits of lower unemployment, and these trade-offs involve 
value judgements. Stiglitz returned to this theme in fact in Freefall (2010) by arguing that it is not 
so much the details of regulatory policy that we ought to be considering in the wake of the financial 
crisis, but the ultimate goals: what is the role of regulation and what type of economy we want? 
These are key political questions and cannot indeed be answered by institutions independent from 
politics -and one could argue detached from democratic legitimacy. In the words of McNamara 
(2002, p. 53) severing the direct institutional ties to elected officials appears to create an apolitical 
environment for policy making, while central banks continue to make policies which have 
important, identifiable distributional effects and thus remain resolutely political and therefore 
partisan institutions. This is true without even beginning to consider the wealth of literature 
suggesting (as noted earlier) that inflation targeting in itself has dubious beneficial consequences 
on the economy (Bruno and Easterly 1996). 
 
The independence of the Bank of England (BoE) is recent example of contemporary controversy 
generated by the left of the political spectrum. Jeremy Corbyn, Leader of the Labour Party (the 
Opposition in the House of Commons), proposed at the time of the British general election in 2015 
a so-called People's Quantitative Easing (PQE) policy (Bootle 2015), which would require the BoE 
to print money in order to finance government investment. This was to be achieved (Yates 2015) 
through purchasing bonds issued by a state-owned National Investment Bank. Then this National 
Investment Bank, would use the money to fund public infrastructure projects, including housing 
and public transport. This, apart from being a highly politically controversial topic, raised 
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questions as to the possible threat that the proposed policies might pose to the independent status 
of the BoE, as a PQE would be materially different from the quantitative easing policies pursued 
after the financial crisis with the aim of injecting liquidity in the private sectors of the economy. 
 
One could argue however, that any policy mix should be at the discretion of the government and 
that in a democratic polity it is the legislator, empowered by citizens, that gives institutions, like 
central banks, their independence to begin with. Consequently, a future Labour government could 
legislate to instruct the BoE to pursue policies including PQE. Mishkin (1998, p. 56) argued that 
having a central bank with a legislated mandate and goal dependence are basic democratic 
principles. The public is able to exercise control over government actions, and as by extension the 
goals of monetary policy are set by the elected government through legislation, the link of 
accountability is maintained. If the institutional commitment to price stability comes from the 
government in the form of an explicit, legislated mandate for the central bank to pursue price 
stability as its overriding, long-run goal, there is no tension between popular mandates and 
institutional independence. Indeed, central bank independence does not mean lack of 
accountability, as a higher degree of independence must be accompanied by greater accountability 
and judicial control to ensure equilibrium in policy-making. 
 
Accountability is naturally linked with central bank independence (Nika 2018), since an 
independent central bank allows for the delegation of responsibilities to unelected monetary 
policymakers. Thus, in order to legitimise the role of a central bank within a given constitutional 
system, a substantial degree of accountability is required to insure against any perception of 
democratic deficit (Briault et al. 1996). Therefore, the main role of accountability is to ensure the 
appropriate democratic control and good governance in the delegation of monetary policy powers 
to technocratic officials. Accountability means in this context that institutions with the power to 
affect the lives of people are subject to the scrutiny by the elected representatives of these people. 
As such accountability of institutions is an essential and constituent element of a political economy 
(Padoa-Schioppa 2004, p. 33). Critiques of central bank independence however may adopt the 
language of democracy and accountability, while having other goals. It is to these we turn to now, 
by considering attempts to bring central bankers to heel, following the wishes of political strong-




With monetary policy being expansionary at a time of sluggish growth since the end of the 
financial crisis and little inflation in the majority of developed economies, one might have expected 
few criticisms of central bank policy from the right of the political spectrum. But that has not 
generally been the case. Some of the criticisms aimed at central banks have related to the slow 
tempo of the recovery; others to the possibility that one aspect of the unconventional economic 
recovery measures (such as negative nominal interest rates) may have had unintended effects (for 
example weakening commercial bank profitability, impairing lending). Perhaps the main general 
criticism is that the unprecedented low level of nominal and real interest rates has been stimulating 
over-borrowing, creating a debt over-hang, which may encourage present expenditures, but at the 
expense of fuelling future fragility and storing potential crises. The main reasons for such attacks 
though, have related to their distributional and directional effects (Goodhart and Lastra 2018, p. 
Chapter: Institutional Metamorphosis  © Ioannis Glinavos 2019 
Draft 12 (5.9.19)  Page 9 of 16 
52). The assumption is that if politicians were in charge, they would have done things differently, 
with better outcomes for -what everyone likes to call- ‘ordinary working people’.  
 
This critique isn’t new.  In the USA, concerns about the role of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and its 
detachment from political processes predates the election of President Trump. For example, in 
2016 the Senate rejected the controversial ‘Audit the Fed’ legislation, proposed by Republican 
Senator Rand Paul’s calling for tougher audits of the Fed. The legislation aimed at eliminating 
restrictions on the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits of the Fed and mandated 
that the Fed's credit facilities, securities purchases, and quantitative easing activities be subject to 
congressional oversight. In Paul’s words (2016) ‘nowhere else but in Washington, D.C., would 
you find an institution with so much unchecked power.’ The Obama White House called Paul’s 
proposal dangerous and as Jason Furman, Chairman of President Obama’s Council of Economic 
Advisers, highlighted (Sainato 2016): ‘Congress shouldn’t be telling the Fed what to do with 
monetary policy.’ This episode also raised questions regarding the independent status of the Fed 
with Ben Bernake (the then Chairman) stressing (Garver 2016) that this would result in a direct 
involvement of the government in monetary policy decisions, calling into question the Fed’s 
independence.  
 
Populist leaders (primarily, but not exclusively) have led criticism of independent central banks in 
the last few years. Highlights include the firing of the Turkish monetary policy maker Murat 
Cetinkaya by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who claimed the power to appoint rate-setters and 
put his son-in-law in charge of economic policy after winning re-election in 2018; and US 
President Donald Trump’s attacks on new Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell (and incessant 
criticism of his predecessors) for raising interest rates. Reports suggested (Amaro 2019) that the 
US President has also looked at ways to legally demote the Federal Reserve Chairman. 
Appointment and dismissal procedures are important indicators of legal and de facto central bank 
independence (Cargill 2016). In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson had also considered firing then-
Fed Chairman William McChesney Martin, but upon learning that he lacked the legal powers to 
do so, opted instead to complaining privately (Murphy 2018). Even the European Central Bank, 
which is generally viewed as the institution most isolated from politics, saw the head of Germany’s 
ruling Christian Democratic party urging incoming ECB chief Christine Lagarde to shift monetary 
policy to make it comply with the bank’s inflation-targeting mandate, while Italy’s Deputy Premier 
Luigi Di Maio accused the ECB incumbent Mario Draghi of ‘poisoning the climate’ by weighing 
into the debate about the Italy’s budget (Koc et al. 2019). In Britain, Bank of England Governor 
Mark Carney has long faced accusations of bias from pro-Brexit politicians, who say he is overly 
negative about Britain’s future outside the European Union. MP Jacob Rees-Mogg, for instance, 
dubbed him the ‘high priest of project fear’. Carney denies the charge but was confronted with 
hostile comments after the BoE published scenarios showing that a no-deal Brexit could unleash 
a savage recession and a collapse in the pound. UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, had herself 
criticised the ‘bad side effects’ of BoE policies at the Conservative Party conference in October 
2016, prompting Carney to respond that he would not take instruction from politicians on how to 
do his job (Bruce & Hobson 2016). 
 
We should take a moment to reflect however on whether it is correct to taint the politicians 
mentioned above with the label populist. The chapter uses the word ‘populism’ to denote the 
policies of any political party of the right, or left, that does not share the main economic tenets of 
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an ‘orthodox’ liberal, central establishment. Adopting the definition of Goodhart and Lastra (2018 
p. 50), we can describe ‘populism’ as involving a major disagreement with the central liberal tenet 
that allowing the free movement of labour, capital goods and services between nations would be 
both generally beneficial and desirable in almost all circumstances. A populist therefore is someone 
wanting to restrict the movements of people, capital, goods and services between nation states. 
Further, linking to an earlier designation of ‘autocratic’ leaders, a populist would be a politician 
who, once having been democratically elected, would then seek to remove the checks and balances 
generally applied in a democratic state, in order to achieve the objectives upon which he (or she) 
was originally elected. This dual definition therefore combines the control of the movement of 
factors of production and products across national borders and a desire to achieve autocratic control 
over all executive powers of government, once having initially been democratically elected. Not 
all national populist movements are necessarily antidemocratic however, or totalitarian, or ‘fascist’ 
in nature (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018). Often their challenge is a direct assault on the institutions 
of liberal democracy that populists consider cut-off from democratic processes, or more broadly 
(and vaguely) ‘the popular will’. This is most evident in the area of economic institutions. The 
implications of populism on central banking specifically are a challenge to the exclusive focus of 
central banks on price stability; pitting a deflationary bias of economic policy against employment 
generation and growth (Rodrik 2018). This, of course, could be a legitimate challenge (as discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter), yet a populist narrative has negative consequences on the nations’ 
political economy. This is because while the problems identified by populist leaders (for example 
with respect to central banks) are real, their solutions are irrelevant, wrong or in many cases non-
existent (Merler, 2018).   
 
Pressures on central banks are of course not limited to the developed world (Condon 2019). In 
South Africa, since an attempt by the country’s anti-graft ombudsman in 2017 to have the Reserve 
Bank’s mandate altered, it’s Governor (Lesetja Kganyago) feels the need to continuously make the 
case for central bank independence (Kganyago 2019). India’s new central bank governor, 
Shaktikanta Das, is seen as someone more amenable to government requests to relax tough 
regulations imposed on banks and is likely to ease monetary policy in an attempt to boost growth. 
Mr Das succeeded Urjit Patel, who resigned after a public row with Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi’s government. In what is perceived as a related development, Deputy Governor Viral 
Acharya, one of the central bank’s most outspoken officials, unexpectedly announced in June 2019 
that he was standing down (Shastry 2019). The Pakistani central bank’s independence has also 
come into question after Prime Minister Imran Khan replaced the governor in May 2019 as part of 
an overhaul of his economic team to address the nation’s poor economic performance. In late 2018, 
he announced plans to make the central bank report any currency adjustments to a committee after 
successive devaluations of the national currency (Mangi and Dilawar 2018). Central banks in 
Russia, Nigeria, Greece and Thailand have also been subject to pressures by politicians in recent 
years. 
 
Central banks have traditionally justified their powers with a mix of intellectual rationales for 
institutional independence -aimed at what are identified by many as ‘elites’-, combined with the 
cultivation of a mystique of economic success to win over the general public. This set of 
communication strategies left a critical void according to Adolph (2018). As economic prowess 
since the financial crisis has fallen away and the success of monetary policy became less visible, 
the long-term cost of silence on issues such as inequality has come into focus, something that we 
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touched upon earlier when discussing criticisms of central banking from a critical (left) 
perspective. One could argue that intellectually and rhetorically, the US Fed and other central 
banks are poorly situated to defend the legal powers of their institutions or the process by which 
they develop policy. The delay in nurturing an informed debate grounded in the real effects of 
monetary and fiscal policy has led to the populist hysteria against independent institutions (central 
banks first amongst them) that we are experiencing today. 
 
But what is it that so many leaders of the world wish to achieve that is undermined by central 
banks? At the beginning of the chapter we discussed how inflation targeting has been the primary 
aim of monetary policy and the core objective of central banking in the modern era. We also 
discussed how such focus on inflation can have consequences on the growth balance of the 
economy in a number of areas, including on employment. The latter has been the focus of much 
critique of central banking coming from the left of the political spectrum as already described. The 
critique from current leaders (belonging mostly to the right wing of politics) may have to do more 
with the balance between debt and inflation, than effects on employment and growth. President 
Trump appears to be focused on interest rates, but not on inflation. A looser monetary policy would 
allow the US government to finance debt more easily by letting the resulting higher inflation erode 
the value of the currency in circulation and, if a spike in inflation surprises markets, to eat away at 
the value of pre-existing debt. There is actually good precedent on using inflation as a tool for debt 
relief, as former US presidents regularly sought to enlarge the budget deficit while persuading the 
central bank to keep interest rates low. Economists call that practice ‘monetizing the budget 
deficit’, and it tends to be part and parcel of rising inflation (Blinder 2019). As discussed earlier, 
in the 1970s, before the institutionalisation of central bank independence, it was normal for 
politicians to manipulate interest rates to boost their own popularity (Economist 2019). This 
however led a number of nations to experience a plague of inflation and in extreme cases, which 
the United States has thus far managed to avoid, monetizing deficits can lead to hyperinflation, 
seriously degrading the economic power and prospects of a country. One only needs to look at 
Zimbabwe and Venezuela as contemporary examples of the effects of unchecked inflation. While 
one could argue that developed economies are more in danger of deflation (than inflation), at the 




Popular perceptions of independent institutions and of the legitimacy of state behaviour are 
currently changing. The model of central banking prevailing before the financial crisis was the 
result of a century-long quest for a monetary technology that would achieve two important 
objectives. Firstly, to be more efficient than the gold standard, and to avoid the sustained inflation 
and deflation episodes that affected that arrangement. Secondly, it sought to avoid the prolonged 
and acute price instability that had characterised the period after the gold standard was abandoned 
around the time of the First World War. From an institutional perspective, the technical and non-
political task of identifying the best tools to achieve price stability fits well with the attribution, 
within a democratic policy, of this task to an independent agency (Papadia and Välimäki 2018, p. 
256). The predominance of technocracy and institutional independence that underpinned our 
understanding of the market-state relationship since the end of the cold war is being upended, 
however, by renewed calls for re-politicisation from across the political spectrum.  
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The chapter has discussed how President Trump in the USA and the Labour Party leadership in 
Britain as well as several prominent leaders in emerging economies have transcended ideological, 
national and class divides in order to stake a populist challenge to the idea of central bank 
independence. We are witnessing calls for a return to political-institutional environments long 
extinct in the west, and (up until recently) in retreat in the developing world. The chapter has 
argued that this populism-fuelled critique is divergent from the literature on empowerment and 
greater accountability that was developed in response to the 2008 financial crisis. We are faced 
therefore with a metamorphosis of a debate towards undemocratic, capricious, populist and state 
centric directions. This phenomenon has profound implications for emerging economies where 
efforts to build a pro-market institutional and legal framework have focused on the promotion of 
independent institutions. What this contemporary environment means for emerging economies is 
that a new vulnerability is revealed. Emerging economies looked to the western capitalist states 
for leadership and best practice examples on institutional development. This is not meant to convey 
the idea that western influence is always benign or always correct; see for example misguided 
efforts to promote capitalism in post-soviet transition economies during the nineties (Glinavos 
2010). Nonetheless, one can be critical of the negative aspects of capitalism and the consequences 
of western domination, while still accepting institutional innovation as a source of progress.  
 
Governance problems in developing nations and emerging economies are real. Issues with 
inefficiency, politicisation and corruption are live concerns for millions of people. Missed 
opportunities and lacklustre growth aren’t only the result of western domination, predatory 
multinationals and unfair world trade rules. The former fits well a populist narrative that tries to 
blame ‘others’, usually foreigners, for any and all problems. National economic problems are to a 
significant proportion the results of domestic failures, inadequate technologies and political 
machinations. The promotion of independent apolitical institutions is meant to deal precisely with 
these types of weaknesses experienced by emerging economies. Detaching the setting of interest 
rates and monetary policy from the political timetables of frequently self-serving politicians 
sounds undemocratic, but may be a necessary component of a strategy to set a nation on a 
sustainable growth trajectory. After all, by the same measure that one can decry ‘capitalist’ 
institutions for being undemocratic, one could condemn the politicisation that subjects economic 
rationalism to political calculation for personal gain.  
 
What is the central message of this chapter on the changing political economy around central bank 
independence? The material presented here demonstrates that the populist assault on institutional 
independence in the west robs the developing world from the external impetus for reform. If 
America and Britain (to take two key examples) abandon their ethical leadership, retreat from a 
defence of liberal values, from free trade and even capitalism itself, what incentive is there for 
developing nations to continue along the path of reform? And it is to such a path that they should 
remain committed, as it represents the most likely avenue to an improved future life for their 
citizens. A collapse of confidence in liberal values in the west strengthens traditionalist, nativist 
politicians in emerging economies. It weakens those who advocate for reform if the ‘shining city 
upon a hill’ (Reagan 1989) is no longer a bright beacon to follow. Independent institutions are a 
bulwark against autocracy, not a threat to democratic governance. Policy makers in emerging 
economies would do a service to their nations to think of them as such. 
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